What is a postmortem? Blameless incident analysis in IT operations

The term comes from medicine, but in IT it has nothing to do with autopsies: in IT operations, a postmortem is a written analysis after an incident that describes what happened, what impact it had, why it occurred, and what we are changing so that it doesn’t happen again. You may also come across it as an incident review or post-incident review (PIR). It isn’t written during troubleshooting but afterwards, in calm conditions – and it doesn’t look for a scapegoat, but for things that can be fixed.

The big providers regularly publish their postmortems, and we have already written about several of them. In this article we look at how to write a postmortem for your own systems in a smaller team.

What does a postmortem mean in practice?

A good postmortem answers three questions:

  1. What happened, and who was affected? Facts, timeline, impact.
  2. Why did it happen? Root cause and contributing factors.
  3. What are we doing about it? Specific tasks with an owner and a deadline.

If the third part is missing, the document is just a story. If the first two are incomplete, the tasks have no solid basis.

A blameless culture

According to the chapter on postmortems in Google’s SRE book, a blameless postmortem identifies the contributing causes of the incident without indicting any individual or team, and assumes that everyone involved had good intentions and acted on the information they had. There is a practical reason for this: if colleagues fear that the document will be used to hold someone accountable, they keep quiet about the details, and exactly the ones you could learn from are lost.

The difference shows in the wording. Instead of “The colleague restarted the wrong server”: “The names of the two servers differed by one character, and there was no confirmation step before the restart.” The first blames a person, the second points to a process that can be fixed. If someone was able to make a mistake, the system allowed it – that is what needs to change.

When should you write a postmortem?

You don’t need one after every alert. It’s worth setting the thresholds in advance, so you don’t have to argue about it after the incident. Google’s SRE book lists these typical cases:

  • a user-visible outage or slowdown above a defined threshold;
  • any data loss;
  • on-call intervention (rolling back to an earlier version, rerouting traffic);
  • a recovery time longer than a threshold;
  • a monitoring failure, that is, when the incident was noticed by a person, not by an alert.

At a small company, a good starting point is: after every outage affecting clients that lasts longer than 30 minutes, every data loss and every security incident. “Near misses” – for example a backup that turns out not to have run for weeks – are also worth writing up; they are the cheapest lessons.

The structure of a postmortem

Section What goes in it?
Summary 3–5 sentences: what happened, when, for how long, what the cause was, what the main action is
Impact Affected services and clients, duration, data loss, SLA impact
Timeline Times in one time zone: first sign, detection, interventions, recovery
Root cause and contributing factors The direct technical cause, and every circumstance that made it possible or made it worse
What went well? Anything that sped up detection or recovery
What didn’t work? Where we lost time, what was missing
Action items Specific tasks with an owner, deadline and priority

A few practical tips:

  • Timeline: use a single, stated time zone. Put it together from the timestamps of alerts, chat messages and logs, not from memory. The time between the first sign and detection often says more than the fault itself.
  • Root cause: there is rarely only one. The “5 whys” method is a good start, but in real incidents several factors typically come together: a bug in the code, a missing test, an alert that didn’t fire.
  • Action items: “we’ll pay more attention” is not an action item. An action item is good if it can be verified: “Alert if the daily backup hasn’t run for 26 hours – owner: X, deadline: 14 August.” Track the action items in your existing ticketing system, not just in the document, otherwise they get forgotten.

A short template

# Postmortem: [short title] – [date]

Status: draft / reviewed / closed
Author: ...        Participants: ...

## Summary

## Impact
- Affected service(s):
- Duration: [start] – [end] (CEST)
- Affected clients, users:
- Data loss:

## Timeline
| Time | Event |
|------|-------|

## Root cause and contributing factors

## What went well?

## What didn’t work?

## Action items
| Action item | Owner | Deadline | Ticket |
|-------------|-------|----------|--------|

Make the review a mandatory step. According to Google’s SRE book, “an unreviewed postmortem might as well never have existed.” In a small team this can be a half-hour meeting in the week after the incident, with the owners of the action items present.

What can we learn from public postmortems?

The big providers’ public analyses are a good model of what a thorough postmortem looks like.

CrowdStrike, July 2024. After the faulty Falcon update, the company published a preliminary review five days later, and the detailed root cause analysis on 6 August. This is a good example of how the first version can be incomplete, as long as it says what is still to come. According to the root cause analysis, the new template type defined 21 input fields, but the sensor only passed 20; the content interpreter didn’t check the bounds, and the pre-release validator didn’t catch the error either. Several contributing factors together, rather than a single fault.

AWS, October 2025. The summary of the us-east-1 outage gives a timeline accurate to the minute, and it doesn’t stop at the direct cause, a race condition in DynamoDB’s DNS automation: it describes how the fault rippled on into EC2 and the Network Load Balancer. The action items are specific: the DNS automation was disabled worldwide until the fix, and for the NLB they are limiting how much capacity health check failures can remove. It doesn’t name a person anywhere.

Cloudflare, November 2025. The analysis of the Cloudflare outage came out the same day, with a timeline table, a code snippet and an apology. The most important part is the list of action items: they will validate their own generated configuration files the same way as user input, and they are building in more global kill switches. This rules out not just that particular fault, but a whole class of faults.

What they have in common is that they are factual, they don’t make excuses, and the action items are systemic.

Common mistakes

  • It is finished too late. After two weeks the details are already lost; the first draft should ideally be ready within a few days.
  • The action items have no owner, so they never get done.
  • It only looks for the technical cause, not the process (notification, escalation, documentation, access).
  • Nobody reads it. Put the postmortems in a shared, searchable place (a wiki or a Git repository), and when a similar incident happens, check what became of the earlier action items.

A postmortem is worth the time spent on it if the next incident is shorter, or doesn’t happen at all. If you need help setting up the incident management process, monitoring or the on-call rota, take a look at our Cloud and DevOps services.

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